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Book Review by Robert Looney of Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf, 2019

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Second, neither 'Arafat nor the PLO were prepared to sign an agreement or enter into negotiations with Israel, nor even enter into a measure of self-rule without a firm promise of a state. Why did Israel have such intense opposition to the PLO? The author fails to mention years of PLO-sponsored terrorism and hundreds of deaths that the PLO inflicted on Israel at Munich, Ma'alot, and elsewhere, in multiple airplane hijackings and in the killings of American diplomats in Sudan and Lebanon. 'Arafat and the PLO are given a pass for bad decisions and terrorist action because it decided for 15 years not to drop either "armed struggle" or violence against Israel. In 1987, 'Arafat said, "any nation that loses the military option does not deserve to live . . . continue building up force until we reach a strategic military balance with the Israeli enemy."⁴ Months later, he confirmed, "we absolutely reject negotiations with the Israeli enemy."⁵ As 'Arafat told envoys to President Carter, he insisted on a promise of self-determination as a prerequisite to talks. On September 12, 1993, 'Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist, still without a promise of self-determination.

Third, what were the implications of the 15-year delay? In October 1988, Nabil Sha'ath, a PLO Executive Committee member said, "no matter the faults of Camp David, it gave us an opportunity to have our legitimate rights considered. We were not prepared for Camp David."⁶ Looking back, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak noted in 1992, "Today we regret not having implemented Camp David. Today 75 percent of the occupied territories are covered with settlements. We had them in our hands without settlements. Today some still say that they reject the Camp David accords."⁷ Anziska

concur that the PLO delay was a political error, writing: "there were only four thousand Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza when Begin entered office in 1977, and by the end of 1992 there were more than 100,000" (p. 300).

History's unfolding does not give re-funds; there are no do-overs. The burden for bad choices or bad timing often rests with leadership. 'Arafat made many bad choices for the Palestinian national movement, not the least of which was his personal refusal to enter negotiations, or even test them sincerely with the most pro-Palestinian US president of the 20th century.

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GULF AFFAIRS

Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf, by Jim Krane. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019. 206 pages. \$30.67 cloth; \$14.43 paper.

Reviewed by Robert Looney

Every once in a while, a volume appears that explains the need for a paradigm shift in our thinking as to the way the world works. Jim Krane's *Energy Kingdoms*, which assesses the rentier state model as applied in the Gulf context, is such a volume. Krane begins his fascinating account of energy subsidies in the Gulf region with an often-quoted line attributed to Saudi Arabia's King Faisal bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud: "In one generation we went from riding camels to riding Cadillacs. The way we are wasting money, I fear the next generation will be riding camels again" (p. 1).

As Krane aptly observes, substituting oil for money sets the tone for his volume.

While acknowledging significant differences between the Gulf countries — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United

4. Yasir 'Arafat, *Algiers Voice of Palestine*, November 28, 1987, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Middle East and North Africa, December 1, 1987.

5. *al-Hawadith* (London), January 29, 1988.

6. Interview by the reviewer with Nabil Sha'ath, October 2, 1988, Cairo.

7. Remarks by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Cairo Egypt Radio Network, April 30, 1992, as quoted in FBIS, Middle East and North Africa, May 1, 1992.